When Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech Confront Holocaust Denial and Group Libel: Comparative Perspectives by Tishler, Gerald
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 8
Issue 1 Holocaust and Human Rights Law: The First
International Conference
Article 7
1-1-1988
When Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech
Confront Holocaust Denial and Group Libel:
Comparative Perspectives
Gerald Tishler
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School.
For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gerald Tishler, When Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech Confront Holocaust Denial and Group
Libel: Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. Third World L.J. 65 (1988),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol8/iss1/7
WHEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH CONFRONT HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND 
GROUP LIBEL: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES* 
Mr. Gerald Tishler: I What we're going to discuss in this panel is, to a Holocaust survivor, 
the most important issue of all. In my own subjective experience, I've known hundreds 
of survivors and they all respond differendy to the Holocaust. But the one common 
theme, the one common response they have, is their anxiety about historical inaccuracy 
concerning the Holocaust. In their wildest imagination, the survivors who were liberated 
in 1945 could not have conceived of an outright denial of the Holocaust ever happening. 
Of course, in 1945, and indeed for almost twenty years thereafter until the Eichmann 
trial,2 very few people knew what had actually occurred. But today we find not only the 
actual former Nazis and the neo-Nazi groups in Europe, but what would appear on the 
surface to be historical groups, such as the Institute for Historical Review.' These groups 
actually misconstrue and misrepresent history, by either denying that the Holocaust ever 
occurred or by relegating it to a footnote in World War II history. They don't even 
extrapolate from it the important components, the fact that it was politically motivated 
and that the trains and ovens kept rolling long after the Germans knew that they were 
going to lose the war. This phenomenon comes into conflict with the first amendment, 
which you know in terms of the ostensible right to say whatever you want, particularly 
in the academic context. 
* This panel discussion was originally published in 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 559 (1987). The BOSTON 
COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL gratefully acknowledges their permission to reprint this 
portion of the conference. The panelists have made some slight changes in their remarks from the 
version that appeared in the CARDOZO LAw REVIEW. 
I Mr. Tishler is a partner at the Boston law firm of Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer. He is 
Vice-Chairman of the Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation, Inc., and is a member 
of the Anti-Defamation League's New England Regional Board and Civil Rights Committee. Mr. 
Tishler also serves on the Board of Overseers, the Tauber Institute for the Study of European 
Jewry, Brandeis University. He is a graduate of Boston College Law School and is a former Captain 
in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. 
% Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Isr. 1961), a/I'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 
(Sup. Ct.lsr. 1962). Adolf Eichmann was tried under the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) 
Law, 4 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 154 (1950). Eichmann's spectacular capture and televised trial 
suddenly brought graphic details of the Holocaust into the homes of millions throughout the world. 
See e.g., T.V.: The Eichmann Trial, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1961, at 55, col. 4. 
5 
The Institute for Historical Review purports to be a historical revisionist society whose 
objective is to bring history into accord with the facts by publishing and conducting 
educational programs on twentieth century historical events, particularly the Holo-
caust, which the institute believes is a distortion that should be clarified in order to 
prevent future wars and eliminate the "undue influence" that Israel exerts on Amer-
ican foreign policy. 
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AsSOCIATIONS § 14099 (21st ed. 1987). 
The institute publishes a quarterly JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW, a semiquarterly newsletter, 
and has published A. BuTZ, THE HOAX OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1975), and P. RAsSINIER, 
DEBUNKING THE GENOCIDE MYTH (1978). 
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We will first hear from Professor Irwin Cotler' who will tell us what the law is in 
Canada, and what the experience has been in Canada particularly with respect to criminal 
prosecution for group libel. Then we will hear from Professor Alan Dershowitz5 who 
will explain to us his perceptions of the conflict and of the tension that I've described 
between, and I use the term advisedly, free speech and Holocaust Denial. Finally, 
Professor Arthur Berney6 will address the same subject. 
Professor Irwin Cotkr: I think it's an example of the Orwellian character of our times that, 
forty years after the end of the Holocaust, Canada has emerged as the world center for 
Holocaust Denial litigation; that the prosecution of Ernst Zundel,? one of the two pros-
ecutions in Canada for Holocaust Denial dissemination, ended up, as MacLean·s.s our 
national magazine, called it, a situation where the Holocaust and not just Ernst Zundel 
was put on trial. Why? How did all of this happen? Could it have been prevented? How 
do we deal with Holocaust Denial dissemination? Is the criminal sanction an appropriate 
method for dealing with this dissemination? Let me just discuss a number of questions; 
at this point. I'll take them seriatim. 
First question: How did it all begin? For some time, Ernst Zundel, a commercial 
publisher in Toronto, had not only been the chief disseminator of Holocaust Denial and 
hate propaganda in Canada, but also had been the chief exporter internationally of this 
material to centers in Europe and elsewhere. 
After suffering under a constant barrage of this material, one Holocaust survivor, 
Sabina Citron, sought to lay a sanction or complaint under the criminal code. We have 
4 Professor Cotler is an associate professor of law at McGill University Law School and has 
taught international law at Harvard Law School. He had helped defend Antoly Scharansky and is 
active in anti-apartheid work. Professor Cotler has testified before the Deschenes Commission. the 
Canadian governmental body responsible for shaping Canada's policy regarding World War Two 
persecutors. From 1977-1980. Professor Cotler was President of the Canadian Jewish Congress. 
He is one of the original advisory board members of the HolocaustlHuman Rights Research Project. 
S Professor Dershowitz teaches criminal. constitutional. and international human rights law at 
Harvard Law School. 
6 Professor Berney teaches constitutional. arms control. and mass communications law at Boston 
College Law School. He is on the Steering Committee of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights 
Under the Law. and is a member of the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control Executive 
Board. Professor Berney was one of the original Advisory Board members of the HHRRP. 
7 See Martin. Anti-Semite is on Trial. But Did Ontario Bluntkr'. N.Y. Times. Feb. 15. 1985. at A2. 
col. 3. where the case of Ernst Zundel. one of the world's leading distributors of anti-semitic 
literature. is described. He was tried for publishing false news detrimental to the public interest as 
he asserted that the killing of six million Jews during World War II was a fabrication. For news of 
his conviction. see id .• Mar. 1. 1985, at A7, col. 5. On January 23, 1987, the Ontario Court of 
Appeals reversed the Zundel conviction. Her Majesty the Queen v. Zundel, slip op. (Ont. App. Jan. 
23, 1986). In its 125 page decision, the court maintained that the statute under which Zundel was 
prosecuted was constitutional, but held that the conviction must be reversed because (1) the judge 
did not allow defense counsel the proper scope in questioning during voir dire regarding pretrial 
publicity, (2) the judge gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding the required mental state of 
the defendant, and (3) the judge admitted a graphic film on the concentration camps into evidence 
even though it contained prejudicial hearsay. The Canadian government has not decided whether 
to appeal the decision. retry the case. or let the matter drop. 
8 Quinn. Tht Holocawt Trial. MACLEAN'S. Mar. 11. 1985. at 42. 
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a criminal sanction which prohibits the dissemination of hate propaganda or that kind 
of communication other than private conversation which promotes hatred or contempt 
of an identifiable groUp.9 She sought to have Mr. Zundel prosecuted under the hate 
propaganda provisions of the criminal code. However, for purposes of that prosecution, 
you need the consent of the attorney general. lo The attorney general was not prepared 
to give his consent; not because he was not otherwise sympathetic with the concerns and, 
indeed, the anguish of Holocaust survivors, he very much was, but because he felt that 
that section of the criminal code was unenforceable and that a prosecution would lose. 
Undaunted, Citron found another section of the Canadian criminal code, used only 
once in the history of Canada, which made it an offense for someone to willfully spread 
false news causing or likely to cause racial or religious intolerance. II And so, the prose-
cution of Mr. Zundel for Holocaust Denial dissemination proceeded under section 177 
of the criminal code, while at the same time, in Alberta, Mr. Keegstra was prosecuted 
by the Alberta attorney general, under the criminal code provisions prohibiting the 
dissemination of hate propaganda. It 
I should explain the criminal-law framework regarding the dissemination of hate 
propaganda. We have the Canadian Human Rights Act,IS which in effect prohibits the 
dissemination of hate propaganda. We've got similar provisions under the Customs Tariff 
Act,I4 and under the Canada Post Act,U and more recently, group defamation legislation 
was developed in the provinces of British Columbia and Manitobal6 which permit civil 
suits by groups that have been the victims of hate propaganda. 
Second question: What differences were there in the two cases? The differences 
resided very much in the different parts of the criminal code under which each was 
prosecuted. As I indicated, under section 177 of the criminal code, a prosecution for 
willfully spreading false news does not require the consent of the attorney general; the 
hate propaganda provision does. Section 177 has no defenses. The hate propaganda 
provision has four express defenses, which is one of the reasons why the attorney general 
in Ontario felt that the section was unenforceable. In the Zundel case, the main issue was 
9 Canada's Hate Propaganda Act, R.S.C. ch. C-34, § 281.1-.3 (1st Supp. 1970) provides in 
relevant part: 
(1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred 
against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of 
the peace, is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two years .... 
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, 
wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two years .... 
Id. § 281.2(1), (2). 
10ld. § 281.1(3). 
llld. § 177 (1970). This statute provides: "Every one who wilfully publishes a statement, tale 
or news that he knows is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public 
interest is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two years." 
12 See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1983, at A2, col. 3; Mar. 27,1985, at A14, col. 1; July 21, 1985, § I, 
at 5, col. 1 (1970). 
IS Canadian Human Rights Act, 2 Can. Stat. ch. 33 (1976-77). 
14 Customs Tariff Act, 2 R.S.C. ch. C-41, schedule C, § 99201-1 (197,0). 
15 Post Office Act, 6 R.S.C. ch. P-14, § 7(a) (1970). 
16 Libel and Slander Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 243 (1979); Defamation Act, Man. Rev. Stat. ch. 
D20 (1970). 
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Holocaust Denial dissemination, and only subsidiarily the International Jewish Conspir-
acy. In Keegstra, the main issue was the International Jewish Conspiracy, and only 
subsidiarily Holocaust Denial. 
Since Zundel was a commercial publisher who was involved not only in the dissem-
ination of such material in Canada itself, but was also the primary exporter internation-
ally, the issue of Canada's obligations under international law to prohibit this kind of 
exportation became relevant.17 In the United States, which is not a signatory to the 
international covenant on civil and political rights, this would not be an issue. 
Finally, I think there's a difference in the context of the two cases. Zundel was a 
commercial publisher. But Mr. Keegstra was a high school teacher. He had been teaching 
his hate propaganda for some twelve years in an Alberta high school to a captive audience 
of high school students. 
Third question: Could the courts have taken judicial noticel • of the existence of the 
Holocaust as a historical fact? As many of you know, judicial notice is a principle of 
evidence; courts are authorized to take judicial notice of matters which are common 
knowledge and about which reasonable people would agree. One would have hoped, 
indeed argued, therefore, that the Holocaust is at the very least such a matter. One 
might draw a disturbing inference if judicial notice of the Holocaust was not taken: 
Maybe the Holocaust isn't a matter of common knowledge and it is not a matter about 
which reasonable people would agree. Two constitutional courts of West Germany have 
held that the Holocaust was Ojfenkfmtlig, that is, a matter that was obvious. And the 
courts did not permit the matter of the existence of the Holocaust to be debated. I would 
add that in every case in the United States or elsewhere, whic:h involved .u.pected Nazi 
war criminals, there have been findings of fact about the Holocaust. Courts could we 
thOK very cases with respect to taking judicial notice of the ~istence of the Holocautt 
as an historical fact. 
Query: Why then didn't the court in either the Zu1lll41 or the X"gstTa case take 
judicial notice of the Homust? I suspect that it had to do with, or 'WIS not untelakd 
to, the manner and timing of the motion fot taking judicial notice IS ptesetiwd by the 
Ctown ptosett.itor. In othet 'Words, the CtO'WD ptosecutor in the Z",'hIlIl dUe ISked the 
tourt to take juditia1 notice of the existence of the Holocaust IS afi histotitallact; alUlt 
he had 1et in ptosecution evidt1lte and just before the defense .... IS to etite1" its tHe, I 
think that at this point the court, perhaps pt~f"'; felt that it .... oo1d deprive the defense 
of the tight to a fait ttia1 and heating if the motioti 'Wete gtiltIUHi. timftrt'et; if at the 
onset bf the trial the Ctmt'tl ptbSeditot had liSted the cOiitt to take judiclat OOtite; the 
coUrt might have d~ so. 
17 intetiUitiorud CaveiWlt «m Civil and P«JIiticaJ Rights; Dec. HJ; 19t67; itttida 2(1) Ie 18(1), 6 
U .. M. ~. 369, ~74. 
I. The CANADiAN LA" ~Aj:t stateS: 
The ~mel ttttth t1f matt.ets tit wtudt ii Wiltt tit hrir ~ lib jtffltit ate aid 
to be taken jiJdida1 DOte tit. These ate stith mattets ai AdS tit i'at6iifflent aiid ~
l.epIatutes; the oonstittitiOii and ooutse tit mrtute; tiiiiiti ~~~, ~ 
&aments duly Iilithe'ntit:at.e.d. 1ti ~ it wtHi ~ iI:J u~ M ii 
~uttion tit ~ wOUld he ~,. ~ ~ ia;r ~ ii~ aiid 
jUtt tc; be ~ti!d 1ri€h ~. 
CAN..tOWJ LAw ~Aity 210 (i~. 
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Second, it was a jury trial. And because the jury had a responsibility for finding a 
fact, it is arguable that the judge taking judicial notice would have preempted the role 
and responsibility of the jury. Finally, it was the manner in which the motion was made. 
It neither introduced nor relied upon any comparative jurisprudential authority. 
It is possible, ironically enough, that if the court had taken judicial notice of the 
Holocaust, it may weU have resulted in Zundel's acquittal because the only thing that the 
jury would have had to resolve was whether Zundel had a reasonable belief that the 
Holocaust had never occurred instead of whether in fact the Holocaust did or did not 
occur. And I don't think that ajury in Toronto, Ontario, or in Alberta was prepared to 
find itself in a situation where it rendered a verdict of acquittal whose inference, in 
effect, would be that the Holocaust never occurred. It would be different if the court 
had taken judicial notice. Then the only inference that could be drawn was that he had 
a reasonable belief, rather than that the Holocaust did not occur. Because the trial was 
unprecedented, one could say that the Crown was not only unprepared for, but in a 
certain way outmaneuvered by, the defense. The government of Ontario authorized 
only one Crown attorney to handle the case. At the same time, the case became, in effect, 
an international convention for the Holocaust Denial movement. Every Holocaust Denial 
person, whether from Sweden, France, England, or the United States was there, and 
indeed, many of them were admitted as expert witnesses in the trial. The defense lawyer 
for Zundel developed an expertise in ternu of Holocaust Denial litigation, having rep-
resented all of these people, whereas the Crown attorney's only experienct'! was with 
breaking·and-entering cases and this was the first case he had ever handled involving 
Holocaust Denial litigation. 
Finally, 111 dose with the issue of free speech. The Canadian Charter of Kights and 
Freedoms, in section 2, provides II comprehensive guarantee for free speech,'9 whose 
express bnguage is even broadrt than the bnguage of the first amendnurnt.20 It states 
that ftee speech is protected in the following way: Freedom of conscience and religion: 
fte.edmn of thought, opinion, belief; and expression; freedom of the press and other 
tmdu. of communication: fteedom of paceful assemhly, and freedom of liSSOCiation, 
80 you can see a tather comptehensWe protection of what are calted ftmdatnmtal 
freedoms in section 2 of the charter. At the same time, Canada; tItilik.e the United States; 
has built up a tathet wmptehefisiYe regime that limits the dissemination of hate pt~ 
paganda; ttiminat administtative; dvil; and the like. ~ you have here the makings fm 
what in fad was a tmtision between the prohibition of the disseminaOOft t1f hate ptOo' 
paganda and the ftte speech ptote£oon t1f the thartet. tn a prttindt1ilty i~uity prior 
ttl the actual trW itself, the constitutional objettioo raised by defense tOOnsel ;0-0 that 
the hate prtJPiiganrla proviSions ufidet whith both Zundel and J(~gstfa wete prosecuted 
we'te an inftiti8tttiet1t tit the ftee speeth ptOtisWtis. The tourt held that it was the dfflet 
;O-3Y afmind: the W!nte t1f hate pt~nda did not belong to tonstifufitJtiaiiy ptotetted 
~h; iitid thetefOfe was oot diissifiaMe as pttrtected speech tb ~gin ;o-ith, 
19 Catllidim chattet tJf Rights md Fteedotns; CoiIstittitiOtJ Act, 1 Cab, Stat, v (1982). 
20 The first 8ffletldfflent pttmdes: "CmIgtess slui8 make riO law respectiilg aii estabtishfflent tJf 
teHpm; Ot ptbhibitmg the tt~ e:itet8st< tlieteM; jjf abridging the f~ tJf speech, or M the 
Feu; Ot the tight tJf me pedpIe peliteaNy to HSeitiMe, ami to petitiOtJ the gmetiifflent fOt a tedtess 
tJf g&v1iiJt8. H tLS, {Jtjnst afflefflt t 
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Interestingly, the Court of Queens Bench and Alberta relied upon that principle in 
the Chaplinsky21 and Beauharnais22 cases here in the United States, to state that there are 
certain classes of speech whose prevention and punishment have never been a cause of 
constitutional concern - e.g., libel, and by analogy, hate propaganda. 
Finally, as Professor Herbert Packer has said,2s the criminal sanction is uniquely 
coercive and uniquely hazardous and thus should be reserved for things that really 
matter. I therefore agree that it should be a final resort for dealing with the dissemination 
of hate propaganda. I would also agree that other approaches should first be addressed 
- e.g., education. We should try to ensure that the Holocaust is taught in the schools 
so we don't get into an issue of Holocaust Denial or we should require in the licensing 
of teachers a specific prohibition with respect to Holocaust Denial teaching. I think we 
should proceed in Canada under our federal and provincial anti-discrimination legisla-
tion rather than criminal sanctions. 
The advantages to legislation are: The anti-discrimination legislation is civil rather 
than criminal, it is administrative rather than adversarial, it does not give the accused 
the kind of platform he gets in a criminal trial, and the complaint is carried by a Human 
Rights Commission rather than the political trial that can be developed by the accused. 
In my view, the whole question of bringing suspected Nazi war criminals to justice is 
inextricably bound up with the whole question of Holocaust Denial in this sense: Every 
time we bring a suspected Nazi war criminal to justice, we repudiate by the legal process 
the Holocaust Denial movement. Conversely, every time we abstain, for whatever reason, 
and do not bring suspected Nazi war criminals to justice, it allows the inference to be 
drawn that if there were no criminals, it's because there were no crimes. And, indeed, 
this is what Zundel did in his trial. At one point in the trial, he said: "Well, since there 
are no crimes, it must be as well that there are no criminals." And I think the way to 
repudiate Zundel is to say: "Yes there are criminals and it's because there were crimes." 
21 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, de-
nounced organized religion while proselytizing on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire. Despite 
a city marshal's warning that the crowd was getting unruly, he continued his activities. When a 
disturbance occurred, he was taken to the police station. As he was being led away, Chaplinsky 
called the city marshal "a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." He was convicted by 
the state court under a statute that banned "address[ing] any offensive, derisive or annoying word 
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place." The United States Supreme 
Court held that these words did not warrant first amendment protection. The Court stated that 
"such utteran.ces are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality." [d. at 572. 
22 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Beauharnais was convicted under a state statute 
prohibiting the manufacture, publication, or exhibition in a public place of any publication por-
traying "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, 
creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes ... to contempt, derision, or obloquy 
or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots .... " [d. at 251. The Court affirmed his 
conviction, holding that defamation of groups may be unprotected by the first amendment in the 
same way as is libel of individuals; see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), em. denied, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978) (questioning the vitality of Beauharnais). 
23 As Professor Packer stated: 
The criminal sanction is the best available device we have for dealing with gross and 
immediate harms and threats of harm. It becomes less useful a~ the harms become 
less gross and immediate. It becomes largely inefficacious when it is used to enforce 
morality rather than to deal with conduct that is generally seen as harmful. 
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 365 (1968). 
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Mr. Tishler: For those of you who don't know, Irwin, when he was president of the 
Canadian Jewish Congress, was active in the development of some of the legislation to 
which he is referring. We're grateful to him for his contributions and for his continuing 
contributions in this field. Also, obvious to all of you, very active and hardly remaining 
within academic walls is Alan Dershowitz who will follow. 
Professor Alan Dershowit%: I am not going to talk about the first amendment, because I'm 
not a positivist and because I get bored by thinking about how five mediocrities in robes 
may ultimately resolve a given issue. I want to talk instead about freedom of expression 
in the broadest sense of that term. I want to make a strong pitch for why courts and 
governments should never be allowed to be arbitors of truth; should never be allowed 
to be arbitors of whether a particular historical event occurred or didn't occur. I am 
categorically opposed to any court, any school board, any governmental agent taking 
judicial notice about any historical event, even one that I know to the absolute core of 
my being occurred, like the Holocaust. I don't want the government to tell me that it 
occurred because I don't want any government ever to tell me that it didn't occur. 
I want to tell a little story. A few years ago, I was in Madrid debating a Soviet lawyer 
about anti-semitism. I took out some anti-semitic material published in the Soviet Union 
and I said to him: "Isn't this a disgrace to the name of Lenin who was against anti-
semitism that your government should allow this material to be published?" He was very 
well prepared and he took out some anti-semitic material from his briefcase published 
in the United States and he said to me: "My comrade, tell me isn't this worse?" And I 
looked a it, and I said: "Yes, it's worse in one respect, but I want you to look at it and 
tell me if yours isn't worse in another." And he looked at it and he smiled and the 
audience looked at it and they smiled and they understood what was happening. In the 
bottom right hand corner of the Soviet material was a stamp that said approved by 
Glovlet, the Soviet censorship agency. There was no similar stamp on the American anti-
semitic Nazi propaganda; it just said distributed by the Nazi Party, Hoboken, New Jersey. 
The United States Government took no position. It simply said: We will allow ourselves 
to be the printing press of the world; we will allow anything to be published. And I am 
here to oppose censorship of anti-Holocaust material even though I know it hurts, I 
know it causes pain, and I know that somebody who suffered the Holocaust can have 
no worse feeling than having been looked in the eye by somebody who says it didn't 
happen. 
I remember sitting in a meeting with Elie Wiesel and others when we Were discussing 
the Mermelstein case24 and whether the ADL25 or the AJC26 should get involved. Elie 
looked at me with a tear in his eye, and said: "I don't want any court to make decisions 
24 Mel Mermelstein, an Auschwitz survivor, sued the Institute of Historical Review when they 
reneged on their offer to pay $50,000 to anyone who could prove that Jews were gassed at 
Auschwitz. The case was settled when the Institute agreed to pay the $50,000 plus $100,000 for 
Mermelstein's pain and suffering caused by the revoked offer. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 25, 1985, 
at A12, col. 4. 
25 Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Its purpose is "[tJo stop the defamation of Jewish 
people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 
1289 (21st ed. 1987). 
26 American Jewish Congress; composed of "American Jews opposed to all forms of racism and 
committed to the unity, security, dignity, and creative survival of Jews in Israel, the USSR and 
wherever they may be threatened." Id. at 1551. 
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about my existential being. I have to make that decision for myself. It's not for the 
government to do." Historical events evolve and unfold in very complicated manners. 
The Holocaust may not have happened exactly the way we think it happened. The 
detention of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps may not have happened ex-
actly the way we or the Japanese communities think it happened. Slavery may not have 
happened exactly the way we think it happened. Apartheid may not operate exactly the 
way we think it operates. The Marcos regime may not have operated exactly the way we 
think it operated. Every one of those events is far more complex than the romanticized 
version makes it seem in later history. The Holocaust was full of complexity. It was full 
of cynicism. It was full of heroes. It was full of devils. It was full of heroes on the 
German side. And devils on the Jewish side. It was full of extraordinary complexities. 
The Holocaust itself was a metaphor. What does it mean? It's a word for inOamed and 
engulfed. It's not even a word that one can give precise meaning to. In fact, if one looks 
at what the revisionists are saying. the smart ones aren't saying the entire Holocaust 
didn't occur; they're looking at very specific aspects of iL And invoking researCh and 
invoking typical lawyers' cros&-eXaIIlination tools to say it didn't happen exactly the way 
you say it happened. It didn't happen like in the movie Judgment tJI Nuremburg. ~ It didn't 
happen like in the movie Shoah.D It didn't happen in that way because a complex 
historical event which took place over a long period of time can never be encapsulated.ft 
So what are we to do? What are we to take judicial notice of? If Irwin is right that we 
.hould take notice only of thing. about which reatonable people can't disagree, then we 
would only be able to take judicial notice of lOme paN of the Holocaust. Certainly not 
the number six million; that was an approximation. Certainly not the fact that all Jews 
were gassed in the way that movies suggest that they were becalHe it was far more 
OOtnplkated than that. There were pbases, there were stage.. There were time. when 
Jews were killed in leu systematic ways and times when Jews were killed in more 
systematic ways. The very iuue of whether ot not we should litigate the lIoioaust creates 
fot me a very unc~fottable situation. lIere 1 am, sitting in ftmit of you and titting. in 
df«t. as a defender of those with whom 1 iDOIt fundanwntaUy elisa..- and whom 1 
despise. And yet; it is important to explain that no DUitter how obvious a histotkid ~mit 
is to us; no govEitDftUlnt should sit in flnat histmicat judgment ovtt its pHli1D4:tttl, its 
boiifidatres; and its ttuth. 
Just fot one SEico1ld, tOhsid~t an analogy we all know about: the JapatteSEi dewfitimt. 
We all know how simp1e It was: The bad guy AiDeritafiS ti:iiDe and thEir tOUtlded up 
~St tmiMy i1llwt~ttt poopie of.hom thEite was no suspltiott of EiSpkmil~ aiid .~ ~pt 
tlt«tii itt toht4!ttttatimt camps wtwtEi they sutf~ted; flgbtifig and sttUggHfig w get out die 
EifititEi period of titii~. 1t;s a w~ul historital saga. 1t just ~'t tutppmt to ~ mtit~" 
~. The ttuth Is so much lDOte cOfiiplkated. Smne Japatte~Ametitan ~ts toop= 
era~ with the detentiOh. Kiyoshi Hirabayashi'D aiid 'tUYbS&buro Kot~matsuSI wet~ 
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dissidents within the Japanese community who were ostracized for fighting. The various 
choices available to the Japanese-American were very complex. 
J. Edgar Hoover, the ironic hero of the Japanese detention, was against it. It was a 
liberal proposal. J. Edgar Hoover said: "No, I don't have to detain all Japanese-Amer-
icans. Just give me the choice and the discretion to pick out the few dangerous ones and 
I'll figure out what to do with them." And some traditional community leaders responded 
by saying: "No, no, no, don't take our male leaders who can protect us in the event of 
anti-Japanese sentiment in this part of the country. If we have to go, let us go as families 
together." In fact, the birth rate went up, the death rate went down. Truck farming 
broke up. Some of the Japanese-American success in this country can even be attributed 
to this very evil scheme. 
I am a categorical, unequivocal opponent of what happened during the Japanese 
detention. But I would not, under any circumstances, make it a crime to teU the story I 
just told. Nor would I make it a crime to teU the story that the Soviet Union tells about 
complicity between Zionists and people who were effectuating the Holocaust because, 
tragically, there is a kernal of truth to some of those stories, as there is to most half-
truths and lies. I don't want that kernel of truth to be buried under a barrage of 
government telling us what happened and what didn't happen. 
And so, what's the result of this? The result of this is that we have to tolerate a great 
deal of very annoying, very uncomfortable, very erroneous, very wrong-headed lies. 
Many of them are, in fact, lies. 
I just want to end with two questions. The interesting epistemological question, the: 
one that becomes converted into a legal question both for Irwin and me is: How does a 
group turn a crackpot, damnable lie, which the broadest of anti·Holocaust view is, into 
a reasonable revisionist argument capable of being called the dissenting view? That's the 
epistemological question we have to confront and answer. We have failed in this issue 
insofar as the people who have made these daims can call themselves revisionists. We 
have failed because we refuse to confront them in the marketpbce of ideas. We ha-ve 
sfJeDt too much time trying to dose their stalls down without spending enough timt: 
realizing that their point of -view is going to get out. trt's answet and let's prepare for 
it. Instead of putting the Molocaust on trial in Canada, we should have engaged in the 
kind of educational endeavors that Irwin was talking about. 
Let me jUst quitkly list five or siX brief areas where 1 think the dis£ussion should 
eveiituatIy focus. There are differeiices betweeii defeiiding the rights of an&Jt()kJtaust 
material w be published, aiid joiiiiiig with the publishers. We atl ktJ()W that N()atii 
Chooisky, t() hiS etetiial disgrace, wt()te aii introduction to a book tty a S04:illlM itItel1tt~ 
wal named Fautiss()O who denied the e:iUstente of the M()locaust.5i 
1ncidetitally; I finally discoveted what an intellectual Was a few yeats ago; wheii 1 
got iti the mail ati itiVitation to be induded in the International WhtY's Who of ltiteliet~ 
tilills for t~5; That was for paperback; it was $75 fot hatdcovet. it said, if you cati;t use 
it, pass it on to a friend. I'm SUre Faurisson had it passed on tty a friend. 
The secOtid le-vel might be the pdlitics of lIolocaust Deiilill. Pat :buthanan" has 
firuilly, iti hiS long lifetime; found one minority that he can support .=. Nazi wat ttiini-
Sf It FAuIttSWN, MtMoiu EN DtnNst (1980). 
~ fitesident tteagaD;5 White. Home mrettot of Communitations, appointed iii Febtwity 1984, 
.1t<; has ~n highly ttititittd fOt t~pearedly 'Wtiting the j1htue, "sUttUliltMg to ~ f1tetsUt~ of 
the J85,;; an a pete of j1lipet at a nteetitig at whlth je1riSb f&dets .ere adViSibg ~ ~iit iiOt 
to go to die West German temetery at 8itbUtg .here SS soldiets are bUried. N.Y. Times, May 4, 
1985, at A6, col. 4. 
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nals.54 He has made a career of it. He is their man in the White House.55 Two LaRouche 
people getting nominated on a platform which includes anti-Holocaust preaching. 56 
The next level is that of teaching academic respectability: Whether or not a teacher 
should be allowed to teach that the Holocaust didn't exist. And I tell you Irwin, with all 
due respect, that if you start licensing teachers and making them take a loyalty oath as 
to whether they believe the Holocaust existed, the next step is going to be people being 
given equal academic time for the other position. A government must be agnostic. Even 
a teaching government must be agnostic in these situations. The marketplace of ideas 
simply has to be allowed to operate even at the school level. 
At the next level is television and radio, regulated by the FCC. As you know, a radio 
station is owned in Kansas by a group of Nazis who preach hate propaganda and have 
gone too far. They actually gave the names and addresses of various Jewish organizations 
and explained how you can point a gun and shoot into their windows. Now their licenses 
are up for revocation. 
The next step is marches, like the marches in Skokie. Obviously we've heard much 
about that. After that comes neo-Nazi training camps, and caches of arms. All protected 
within our ridiculous law involving possession of guns in this country - but nonetheless 
protected. 
And finally, even when the Nazis actually kill, as they have a radio talk show host!? 
and others,!8 there are civil rights problems. Those Nazis weren't charged with murder. 
They were charged instead with violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act,59 a statute that makes conspiracy laws seem like a paradigm of civil 
liberty and narrowly drawn statutes. So, everywhere we come into confrontation with 
political groups, we run into difficulties with civil liberties. 
I want to end by simply saying I know my view is not a pleasant, happy one, but I 
want you to imagine sitting in a room like this in a country, not ours, at a time, not now, 
and hearing a group of people, not us, but perhaps Croatians, nationalist or others, 
sitting here and talking about whether we should ban discussion of the Holocaust as 
libel. Because, inevitably, if the government can say the Holocaust occurred, then another 
government somewhere, sometime, can say it didn't occur. And I want that to be left to 
truth. From my experience, government is one of the worst judges of truth. 
54 Buchanan has been criticized for a meeting that he had on June 26, 1985, dealing with the 
restoration of United States citizenship to Arthur Rudolph, a rocket scientist, who is accused of 
Nazi war crimes. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at D27, col. 1. 
55 Lyndon LaRouche is the founder of the U.S. Labor Party which includes Zionist groups and 
Jews in its analysis of conspiracies. For a summary of LaRouche's background and of his pro-Nazi 
sentiments, see Montgomery, U.S. Labor Party: Cult Surrounded by Controversy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 
1978, at AI, col. 3, A16, col. 1; Montgomery, One Man Leads U.S. Labor Party on Its Erratic Path, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1979, at Bl, col. I, B5, col. 1 (describing LaRouche's swing to anti-Semitism). 
See also N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at A18, col. 1 ("His literature ... devotes far more space to ... 
support for anti-Zionism in a form that is hard to distinguish from anti-Semitism."). 
56 See Hume, LaRouche Group, Long on the Political Fringe, Gets Mainstream Scrutiny After Illinois 
Primary, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1986, at 32, col. 1. 
" Gary Lee Yarbrough, a member of the neo-Nazi group, the White American Bastion, mur-
dered Denver radio host Alan Berg. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A8, col. 1. 
58 For example, on Nov. 3, 1979, in Greensboro, N.C., at an anti-Ku Klux Klan rally, three 
American Nazi Party members killed five members of the Communist Workers Party. N. Y. Times, 
Apr. 13, 1984, at A19, col. 1. See also Waller v. Butkovick, 584 F. Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (suit 
alleging civil rights violations and official cover-up stemming from the November 3, 1979 rally). 
59 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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Mr. Tishler: Alan, you've articulated a difficult and unpopular position very well, and 
you've generated a lot of questions. 
I think Arthur Berney is going to suggest there's another perspective to this. Arthur, 
like Alan and Irwin, has been active well beyond these walls and is active in a number 
of civil rights organizations including the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights. 
Professor Arthur Berney: There were two things that Alan said that were very disturbing 
to me. One is that the U.S. government should take no position on this question. That's 
very much, to my mind, like saying that the U.S. should take no position on the 
segregation of races in this country. The U.S. government is not just a negative force. 
The other thing that bothered me was Alan's statement that you have to be able to 
tolerate these rather annoying and uncomfortable matters. I think these things are more 
than annoying and uncomfortable. 
To deny a people their history is to deny them the most essential element of their 
group existence. It is always a precursor to the subordination, diminishment, and ulti-
mately the destruction of a people. When the slaves were brought to this country, part 
of the enslavement process was to destroy their history. Once that history was destroyed, 
it took a couple of centuries for the blacks, as a people, to revive themselves. This is 
very, very serious stuff. Not annoying, not uncomfortable. It's more than that. When 
Elie Wiesel speaks out for the survivors, as a survivor, he has a perfect right to say: "I 
will not bring a suit; I will not be involved in it." But he has no right to speak out for 
other survivors who may very well say: "I would like to be able to bear witness and to 
confront the people who are lying about our existence." And sure, lawyers can do the 
sort of thing that Alan just did about truth. Truth is a very complex, detailed matter 
that can be seen in many different ways. But then, there are "big lies" and grand truths, 
too. And when the grand truth is being denied and undermined, you've got to confront 
that in the only way that you can, and that is in a political fashion. That is where the 
government does have some kind of an obligation. 
Speaking of his enemy, Sam Goldwyn was reputed to have said: "Don't pay any 
attention to him. Don't even ignore him." The Jews and other groups in this world have 
learned that this is not an acceptable way of dealing with this kind of distortion of history. 
It is just unavailing. 
I don't agree with what the Canadians have done, at least with respect to imposing 
criminal sanctions. On this much I agree with Professor Dershowitz. But that's because 
you are putting the prosecution into the wrong hands. It ought to be left up to the 
people who have suffered or who are the survivors of the survivors, relatives of the 
survivors, the people whose existence is in jeopardy and has been challenged, so to speak. 
It is their right to bring suit, should they see fit. 
Now, I don't think you need a dissertation on American law. The bottom line is that 
the Beauharnais case, which was relied on by the Canadian cOurt, was a group libel case 
and has generally been characterized as no longer the law of the United States, and 
maybe that's right. It was a criminal prosecution, and I think Judge Skelly Wright is 
probably right in saying that it has spawned no progeny and it has been more and more 
barren of subsequent opinions. 
It's not my position that the Beauharnais case, with respect to group defamation, was 
not a violation of the first amendment. I think there is a very serious first amendment 
consideration. But I want to talk to you about another case of which you may not see 
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the immediate relevance, Runyon v. McCrary.40 In that case, the question was whether 
section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,41 which prohibits racial discrimination in the 
making and enforcement of private contracts, applied to a private school which discrim-
inated on the basis of race. The Court, resting on the thirteenth amendment - which 
doesn't involve a state action requirement - essentially said that Congress could prohibit 
race discrimination by private schools that held themselves open generally to the public. 
But in the same opinion, it felt compelled to say that the case did not involve a challenge 
to the subject matter which is taught at any private school. Thus, the school remains 
free to inculcate whatever values it deems desirable. Parents have a first amendment 
right to send their children to schools, Alan, that promote the belief that racial segre-
gation is desirable. I call that judicial schizophrenia. And why I call it that is because it 
seems to me that it is incongruous to take the position that governmental institutions 
and educational institutions fulfilling a public function may not practice racial discrimi-
nation but may inculcate the children or allow the inculcation of the children with racially 
discriminatory doctrines. The first amendment should not protect the promulgation by 
educators of the doctrines of racial hatred. Now where does that leave my professed 
first amendment concerns? Why do I say that I am also interested in protecting first 
amendment values? My answer comes from what the government has done in other 
contexts. And I'm jult going to cite two other cases. 
One of them is the United Stain v. O'Brim.4% In O'Brim, we had a situation, dem-
onstrations against the Vietnam War with this fellow getting up on the steps - I don't 
know where it was, was it in Boston? - and burning his draft card as a symbolic act to 
try to tell people: "This war is terrible and you should not allow younelf to be drafted." 
Congrns, in responS4: to this kind of acti.ity, had pre.iously ~d a new law that made 
smh symbolic spee.:h su~ect to five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court of the 
United States said that the government in this instance had a legitimate interest to 
prowct: the running of the war. Therefore, the "incidental limitations" on the first 
amendment were justified aCC<Jtding to the Supreme Court. For what putposes? For 
running a war that was not going to ~ merthtown nmt if this person con.-inc.ed iniiny 
peOVk? Atid nen it it could be merthtowti; isn't that the democtatk process? Here was 
a person talking about the government and sa,mg that the govettlmmtt is doing some~ 
thing wtoog. That's where fitst amendment intetests toofit most and shootd ~ es~y 
protected. ~tlt the Court prefertt:!d the gOVt:!ttltiWiltal mtetests to the fitst llfiIeildment 
exetcise of a dissitWilt. 
Let tls tompatt: what happetied in Skokre: The proposed Nazi marth was not !l 
speeth aIotie btlt actioos; detOOtistratiOOs, the weatitig of symbbHt tlilifOftfis; yet the 
tOtltts, tip to the (;(rurt of A~atse saidi "FifSt amendmeilt; symhotit spe«h; no 
iiilmitietit hann:' Yet the haHn was mtlth more iiiliilinetit thah the haHn to the waf 
iiiathitiety involved iil (J'/JriIm. ~y immmetit haHn; 1 db nat tiWllti the SOft of thmg that 
sotm! of tht ~ ih Sk-okre were taliing aOOtlt; that is; bteatht!S of the peatt. t &m't 
40 427 V.s. 100 (1976). 
41 ciVil Rights Ad of 1866; tho ttl; 14 Stat. 27; 
ft ~i U.S. 367 (1968) (twlding that 00 U.S.C. apti. § 462(b)(3) (19.48); as ~ by (19'65) 
Pub; L. 89-152, 7g Stat. 586. did iIOt ~ tteedmD t1t ~ untW ~ lint ~matt .1iet~ 
tbat.statute ~~ ~ tit t1t if Seiettit~  ~g 
~). 
4!1 Cc:ifIiit v. Smith; 578 FJid i 197 (7th Cu; 1978); t:I!rl. dM.itIJ; 4j9 U.S. gi6 (ilJ'i8). 
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consider that to be comparable to the serious imminent harm of psychic trauma that 
was imposed on a group of identifiable people. This is the harm that courts have 
traditionally and appropriately been concerned with. So when you compare a case like 
Collin'" (Skokie) with a case like O'Brien, you understand that the United States govern~ 
ment's interest in each case is very different, and that what government does is protect 
that about which it cares the most. 
Let's just quickly run through a couple of things that the first amendment doesn't 
seem to get in the way of. Seven dirty words, broadcast on a radio station. That's out! 
Professqr Derslwwitz: Why? The mediocrities in robes! 
Professqr Berney: What's the harm?' Who is hurt? Obscenity as a general category, out. It 
is not protected under the first amendment. Personal reputations, Gertz,4!"> etc., out. Not 
protected or protected only in a qualified way. And then there are other things like 
marketplace supports or trade secrets. You can't expose trade secrets. That's going to 
hurt somebody's pocketbook. You can't engage in false labeling - after all, someone 
may misspend a dollar twenty-nine or whatever. 
I'm not saying that those things are not reasonable regulations. What I'm saying is 
that we protect a whole lot of less serious harms than what we're talking about today 
without concerning ourselves with first amendment interests. Is there any first amend-
ment absolutist who it going to say: "Well, the hell with all of that too? The first 
amendment should apply so that all of those other interests - trade secrets or consumer 
protection, etc. - are thrown out:' I think the answer to that is ~ no. 
My final and most important point is: What is at stak here? I think this is political 
speech, and therefore, it does deserve a kind of core: protection. But, as O'lJrien teaches, 
not all political speech is protected. May~ we need w get into a little more refinement 
about what politkal s~ech deserves full protectWn and what doesn't, Where does this 
spe'4:lch tlltch on'? 10 whmn is it directed'? I think we have to ask questWns like that. 
What happetred in lI1inois. recentlY'. with the electWn of the La1totiChe candidates. 
is instructive. UsuallY'. gtoops and individuals who ate ftightened; insecure. and resentful 
... The facts ate weD krwwn. Ftank Collin. leadet of the NatiOftai Sociaiist Party of Anretica, a 
~lf--ptocbiimed Nazi atgatdtatiOh, planned a itlatch fat May t 1917 ki he heM in ftoot M the 
village tiail in Skokie, illinois, a predOfflinantly Jewi~h neighbathood. The Stvetith Circuit affirmed 
a disttkt court detisiott hokiing tlnconstittltioiiai thtee jocai tillage atdinances designed ki Skip the 
itlatth. 'the atdmances that wete sttiitk d(;Wtt had (i) ptbhibited the d~itlinatioii M Hteratiite 
designed to ptotOOte tiidai tenSit1ti, 578 Ud at H!07. (~ ettabied the tillage govemtiient to deny 
itlatth pettffits based 00 the Village's beiief that the pattidpattt's ivouhf diSsetnittate conttovetsiaf 
literatute attd (it) prbhibited the iiSseitlbiy (jf liIeitlbets M a poIitital party tlbtbed iii itlilruity gatb. 
M 
45 in Gettt v. Robert Wekh, Inc.; 418 t.LS. 32!t (1974), the Court. in a &~t(F4 decision, held 
that the protettite Siveep M the tule M New Yatk Titnes Co. v. Suiiitatt; 376ti.S. 254 (1964), tiKi 
rwt msillatea iiiligalitre puMishet ftOffl iiabiiity fat defatttatioii of a ptitate titiren. 418 U.S. at 3m!. 
The plaintiff, a biityet; had tepresented a tlaiii:Ilfflt in hiS sui( against a Chkagoptliiteffilitl. id. at 
325. The iiiligatitre false'ly attUSed the attt1ttley of ftiiitling theoffiret and of being a "COfflitlonist 
tt<1tiU't."id. at~546. in tefUsiiig to extend the New 'tatt Tiii:Ies tule, wluth ~hie1ds puMishets 
ftOffl iiabiiity fatdef3ii:llftiotl. of a ,mMit offitiai absent actuai ttJaiiu, the Coort tejetted the 
~·s tbiiiti that the ~ sui( agaitlSt the ot6tet tt1tistituted sutfitient pubiit intetest. Id. 
at it52. 
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are the groups in which this kind of hate campaign takes hold. It is no fluke that 
LaRouche candidates won in the farm counties of Illinois.46 
It is also no surprise that the Klan is on the rise in Indiana. Those people are in 
economic trouble and they are scared and resentful. Scapegoating, divisiveness, and 
hate-mongering is a time-honored way of diverting reaction away from political reform. 
Consider the paradigm case of Hitler's rise during the Great Depression. Consider 
the stirring of racism in the South in the post-reconstruction period, the heading-off of 
the populist coalition, a political movement which included both blacks and whites. This 
was dangerous to the establishment. The establishment, therefore, is interested in having 
a first amendment doctrine that says: No lawsuits, no rights against hate-mongering and 
racial vilification. Maybe the establishment or government has a stake in a certain amount 
of racist divisiveness. 
If you don't think these tendencies are encouraged by those in power through the 
kinds of cases that I've made reference to, then ask why so many politicians display racist 
signals. Everyone knew what certain politicians meant when they began talking about 
law and order. Or how it is that busing becomes a special word that loses all of its real 
meaning and becomes a slogan? Or consider the ethnic jokes that Secretary Butts made 
and the sexist remarks that Vice President Bush made after the debate with Geraldine 
Ferraro about "kicking ass."4? What is that, other than a manifestation of insecurity with 
respect to a challenge by a woman; a demonstration in a few words to so many people 
across the country that the male order will be maintained. 
When the law says such hate-mongering is protected speech, we may be reinforcing 
the wrong messages. Most of this sort of thing we must tolerate in a free society. But 
when the harms are really egregious, my conclusion is that you have to let the real free 
marketplace operate, and if people feel that they have been aggrieved to their very core, 
then they ought to have a cause of action; a civil remedy. Free speech should not mean 
speech without cost. 
Mr. Tishler: I think all of you share with me the belief that we've heard three absolutely 
first-rate and provocative presentations. There's certainly substantial truth in each one 
of them. Actually, Arthur's close gives me an opportunity to explain to you about the 
Mermelstein case. 
Very, very briefly, Mr. Mermelstein is a survivor of Auschwitz, living in California. 
The Institute for Historical Review promised in its magazine, which was disseminated 
across the United States, to pay $50,000 to anyone who could prove that Jews were 
gassed at Auschwitz. Now, I stood at Auschwitz last summer next to survivors and I 
know Auschwitz existed. And you probably know, perhaps not on such personal knowl-
edge, but you know that Auschwitz existed. You can imagine what Mermelstein's reaction 
was, how outraged he felt. Mermelstein accepted the offer. There was preliminary 
skirmishing that went on with respect to whether or not the Institute for Historical 
Review really wanted to carry this out. But ultimately, the issue was joined. Mermelstein 
submitted an affidavit, and the Institute for Historical Review refused to pay. Mermel-
stein brought suit, not only for breach of contract, but for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, among other torts. Representing him was an attorney who spoke 
46 See supra note 36. 
47 N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at A8, col. 4. 
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within the last six months at a regional Anti-Defamation League conference here in 
Boston, Michael Maroko, who did an absolutely first-rate job. In addition to obtaining a 
judgment against the Institute for Historical Review and against the Liberty Lobby,48 the 
discovery process in the case unearthed the basis, the financial, and the academic cre-
dentials of the people who had founded the Institute for Historical Review; it was 
responsible for its nonexistence now, and for discrediting the Liberty Lobby, an actively 
anti-minority, anti-semitic Holocaust Denial organization. 
The two important points about the Mermelstein case to remember are first, the court 
in California, pursuant to a provision of the California Civil Code, which is replicated 
in every state of the United States including Massachusetts, took judicial notice of the 
Holocaust, and second, took judicial notice specifically that the Jews were gassed at 
Auschwitz, without any further proof. Parenthetically, I disagree with Alan. It seems to 
me that this is a different issue than the free speech issue and involves different consid-
erations. 
But apart from my differences with Alan on the point, as a matter of trial strategy, 
is Eli Rosenbaum still here? Eli was describing to me when he was with the Office of 
Special Investigations, a deportation and denaturalization hearing at which he and the 
other prosecutor decided, in spite of the judge'S willingness to take judicial notice of the 
Holocaust, to prove it. In other words, it might have strategic value in a particular case. 
The problem is, what level of proof do you go to after the last survivor has died? 
Well, in any event, we have the first precedent in the United States directly on point. 
The other aspect of the case is that in lieu of going to trial, the defendants agreed not 
to pay $50,000, but $150,000 in damages, including punitive damages. And substantially 
all of the money has been paid to Mermelstein, who promptly donated it to a Holocaust-
education foundation. So here we have, to my knowledge, the only precedent of its kind 
in the United States - very important, very concrete, very practical - providing a 
remedy, a civil remedy, for an injured party who had specific privity, if you'll excuse 
that word - a direct connection with a Holocaust Denial organization. 
The more difficult question is the one our panelists will address now: What happens 
when you get away from that one-on-one relationship? What happens to the survivor 
not as articulate as Elie Wiesel reading a newspaper article that says that his parents and 
his children and his brothers and sisters never perished in the gas chambers. That it was 
all a hoax. 
Well, Irwin, this is probably a good setting for your rebuttal. 
Professor Cotler: I think that many of us, as we grew up, may remember the refrain: 
"Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never harm me." I think we have 
learned that this may not be the case; that speech can hurt, that words do maim, that 
many of us have felt the pain in being targets of group vilification either as blacks, Jews, 
Asians, and the like. And I think, in this sense, the notion of freedom of expression 
must also connote what I would call freedom from certain kinds of expression. Now, 
this might be said to beg the question; what are these certain kinds of questions? This 
gets me back to what Alan said in an interview this afternoon, as well as to part of his 
48 The Liberty Lobby is a right-wing group which opposes federal aid to education. foreign 
aid. "unfair" foreign competition. E.R.A •• and civil rights. and supports a free gold market. an end 
to forced busing. and repeal of the seventh and twenty-fifth amendments. The group styles itself 
"pro-individual liberty and pro-patriotic." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 1303 (2lst.ed. 1987). 
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remarks. That law, as you put it, is flexible; it should be a flexible, evolving kind of 
concept. 
Professor Derslwwih.: You left out the last part. On the subject of the cumulative capital 
of civil liberties. 
Professor Cotler. Exactly. Responsive, as you put it, to the felt necessities of the time 1 Ia 
Justice Holmes. That if the U.S., therefore, were to capture a Libyan terrorist and bring 
him here, a U.S. court today would exercise jurisdiction. That we should not, to use 
your terms, be encapsulated in rigid formulae. And I assert that we should not be 
encapsulated in the rigid formulae of absolutist first amendment doctrine. But, to use 
your language, we should engage in reasonable balancing. 
The question then becomes: What is the reasonable balance at that point with the 
intellectual spirit of civil liberties and the felt necessities of the time? I suggest to you 
that what the Canadian courts and Parliaments and their reports refer to as a critical 
mass of hate propaganda, of which the Holocaust Denial may be the most pernicious of 
examples, is an example of lOme of those felt needs. 
The question then is: How does one make some kind of determination in accordance 
with the intellectual capital of civil b"berties? Now, I would agree with you that freedom 
of speech is the most fundamental of our rights. It's at the core of our democratic prOCe5l 
and at the core of our self.-determination and human dignity. But I would also think 
that it is not an absolute right. The queItion then becomes, what kind of criteria can 
one suggest? I suggest that the: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomtf!' hM a section 
which applies (0 all of the rights and freedoms in the Charter, which is Ii kind of 
framework of inquiry for this purpose. It guarantees the rights and freedoms 8Ct out in 
it, sUbject only to smh reasonable limitations prescribed by law as can lM dcmontttably 
justified in Ii Cree and deftlO(;fatic society, And the govemmmt or liUth«ity, in mdet to 
lnvok« the benefit m this section, must satisfy this Cout~ptonpd f8( that II litnicmion 
must bt! reasonably pttscribOO by law, demonstrably justifitd in Ii Ctft and ~tatit 
sodtty, Now; 1 suggest to you some q~stions to aUow the ltind of dewtmifflifioo m Ii 
teasonable ~ndng iiptifbath to tJf! done. 
1 would say a1I of these things have to be tak-en together in ordet to atrive at that 
judgmtitt, thie; does this sfJftth constitute an assault ott the iithereitt dipity and .... Mth 
at the human person whose vet)' utterance t~sufts itt substantial hatm or $ty to the 
fiif~ gtOOV? Two; does it thteaten itot onl" th~ i1iliet~itt dipity tJt ~ humait jJttstm; 
but ~ ~wd ~m=th of an humatt bldngs? 1 suggest to yOU that ttftdattj at speech fiitJst 
~ tE!id togethE!t -with att ~wdity tJt tights attd not ~ ttt1i1l it. Tbte4!; ~ it 
un~t the priitdV~ m iiiu1tictdtundism? 1it out Cattadiatt Chattet at :lights atid 
F~s; it says that the cliatter shan t.! itt~~ itt a maniU!t whith not Oidy 
~~ but ~~ tliE! muitittiitutai ~titage ot Cattada. :Mate ~itda omy be 
said to ~ Ii ~t~ m that mu.tl£ultutal he~, tOUt, is it itt ~~ -with mit 
~ ob6~tions uildet iitwnatibmd btw? Cattada has it. 1iii! lUt ~ not have it; 
iii my tie'W; w its disttE!dit. :trite, is it ait ~titiat filitt m any 6~ tJt ideas tit seatth 
ttit ttuth; taiilig thiS out tJt 1Jeti~ aitd cliliplwliJ; or is it m sutli _ St1tiaf ~ 
that atty bettefit that is detitE!d tttItfJ it is bthe~ out1f~ by the ~ iittetett iii 
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order and morality? Six, is it in accordance with principles and policies in other free and 
democratic societies? 
We conducted a study in Canada which showed that sixteen other free and demo-
cratic societies have prohibitions against hate propaganda. The United States is the only 
one of those free and democratic societies that does not have it. To conclude, the Charter 
instructs the courts to look at what international law prescribes, and not simply at 
American absolutist first amendment dogma. And finally, how does it accord with what 
might be called jus gentium in Canada as to what is involved in protected speech? 
My second proposition was that freedom of expression must include freedom from 
certain kinds of expression; it cannot be an absolute notion. There has to be a balancing 
test, as Alan suggested. But when you use that balancing test, and when you use this 
criteria, you cannot come to a conclusion with respect to the felt needs of the time now 
that there are certain genres of hate propaganda that may be excludable in terms of 
protected speech, to resolve the judicial notice issue. What Alan was concerned about 
was the government laying down principles regarding judicial notice. 
First of all, the principles of judicial notice are evidentiary notions. And in the law 
of evidence, within the category of judicial notice, is a category called Historical Facts. 
If the courts are able to take judicial notice of other historical facts, then why can't they 
take judicial notice of the Holocaust as historical fact? 
Second, it would be a particularly disturbing inference to suggest that the courts 
cannot take judicial notice of the Holocaust as historical fact. Because, as I said earlier, 
this would allow the inference that the Holocaust never occurred. 
And finally, it's not government telling us what to do, it's courts engaged in findings 
of fact. And this is not a denial of history. This is a denial of a crime. 
Question: I have two questions. One is for Irwin Cotler. Canada's false news law, section 
177 of the Canadian Criminal Code, is tooted in ancient statutes dealing with standulum 
magtuJlum ~ libels on peel's and ofmials enacted during the l'eigns of Edwatd 1 and 
Mkhatd 11. 'the law was enacted to avoid discord between the tOng and people of the 
tealm, 'Many have criticized the lise of this law in the Zunlkl case and qtiestion whethel' 
it shootd €Vet be used again because of its btoad tel'ins. I want to know whether you 
think that law has any ftittite or whethet it should be used again in futute fJtOSt:Ctitions. 
PtiJfe.f$(Jt Cotler: 1 mtist admit that 1 have advocated the tepeal of that law. I think that 
that pattitulat law is not an appropriate ~hanism fot ptosetutions of hate ptopagatlda 
di~minations. 1 think that the ptovision we shoold have used fot soch ptosettition 
cooldn'( ht used because the consent of the attorney genetal is needed. lhetefote; 
settion 177 had w be used. The tact that it inay be a telit ftom tIenty vll1; howevet, 
~s nm necessatily thean it canoot be tised to respotld to the felt necessity of the times. 
{J}ustion: & you think Zundel will be ulJheld on aweal? 
PtiJftsJof Cotler: 'We", the alJPe8l is going to be atgued in Ortobet, 1986; lind the issUe is 
gmng w be tt~ ~h. t think that both the Zu1ll1tt atld KeegstrlJ dt!tisions will he t1p~td 
on appeal ~tise; tinlike in the United States, thete has been a gtOWing bt1dy bf 
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precedent which says that hate propaganda legislation is a reasonable limitation pre-
scribed by all the mouths of justice in a free and democratic society.50 
Professor Dershowit%: Hold it. We have had three speeches taking a view for suppressing 
speech. We've then had one rebuttal of my view. And two questions directed at my view. 
It's not only unfair ... This free speech is being denied. 
It really makes a point because the next step to denying people the right to claim 
the Holocaust didn't exist is denying advocates of their position the right to defend them 
and to defend their position and I really think that it's very important that a minority 
view, both on this panel and this audience, be given an adequate opportunity to respond. 
Irwin ended his point by saying denial of the Holocaust is not only denial of history, 
but denial of a crime. 
Professor Cotler: I knew that was going to get a rebuttal. 
Professor Dershowit%: If I couldn't deny crimes, I'd be out of business asa criminal-defense 
lawyer. Irwin and I spent years and years denying the existence of a crime, a crime 
committed by Anatoly Scharansky according to the Soviet grand truth. Anatoly got 
additional punishment in prison for denying the grand truth, that he committed a crime. 
Irwin, with his usual brilliance, came up with six criteria for balancing. And I submit to 
you that every one of those criteria for balancing would justify, in many parts of this 
country, a speech that advocated abortion. If you conceive of the fetus as a human being, 
everybody who advocates abortion would be denying every one of those principles of 
law. Because, in the end, the worst truths are grand truths. Let's think about what some 
of the grand truths, to use Professor Berney's phrase, have been over time. Women 
belong in the home. Boy, that was a grand truth! That was a truth that was recognized 
for years and years and years. Jesus is God. Jehovah is God. The earth is the center of 
the universe. The grander the truth, the bigger the lie most often. Segregation is bad. 
That's a grand truth today. Segregation is good. That was a grand truth a few years ago. 
I don't want the schools teaching segregation is bad or segregation is good. I want the 
schools to teach as much as possible so that students can make up their own mind about 
that. And it's no analogy to say, as Professor Berney did, that because we can prohibit 
segregation, we can prohibit somebody who said that slavery didn't exist. There is an 
enormous difference between prohibiting actions and prohibiting advocacy prohibiting 
speech. Denying a people their history - there's a difference between bringing the 
slaves over here, which surely denies them their history, and somebody getting up and 
making an absurd speech saying, "hey, the slaves were happy on the plantation. It was 
a recreational facility. People enjoyed being slaves. I don't know what all this fuss about 
affirmative action is in this country. What do we have to be ashamed of? We rescued 
those barbarians from the trees and we brought them here." Despicable, disgusting 
speech. I do not want that speech banned by any government; I want to be able to 
answer that speech. 
We recently brought a law suit on behalf of a guy named Terzi, the head of the 
PLO, because the State Department would not allow me to debate him. I want to debate 
.0 Professor Cotler was wrong with regard to the Zundel case. See supra note 7. If the govern-
ment retries the case, however, he may ultimately be proved right. 
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that guy because I want to kick his ass in a debate. I don't want the State to deny me 
the right to beat him in a debate and I don't want the State to deny me the anti-
Holocausters in a debate. 
It was stated when I came up here today that I would state an extreme view, and 
that the moderate view would be presented by Professor Berney. I thought that Professor 
Berney's view was the most extreme advocacy of a system of censorship that I've heard 
in a long time because, in the end, if you take his views seriously, what he says is that 
you should be able somehow to prohibit the wrong message. You should have the real 
marketplace of ideas subject to it being expensive to speak. If you take the implications 
of his speech to their logical conclusion, he would ban dirty jokes, he would ban sexist 
statements, he would ban racist statements, and of course, anti-semitic statements. 
Remember, deep down everybody wants to ban something. A couple of years ago, 
women at Harvard suggested that Playboy be taken out of the Harvard Law School 
library because it was offensive to many women. I circulated a memo saying it's a 
wonderful idea, but it should be generalized. Everybody in the Harvard community 
should be able to remove from the library one genre of material that is offensive to 
them. I would probably go with U.N. documents and then the remaining few books 
could be put in a file cabinet somewhere and Widener could be turned into squash 
courts. The squash courts would benefit us all. In the end, there is no way of creating 
these kinds of principles. The principle stated both by Professors Berney and Cotler are 
wonderful principles if Berney and Cotler administer them. But the principles go wild 
when Jerry Falwell, who really speaks for the majority of this country, starts administering 
them. When Andrea Dworkin starts administering them. When President Reagan starts 
administering them. When Warren Burger starts administering them. When Edwin 
Meese starts administering them. Or when William Kunstler starts administering them. 
I don't care whether it's the right or the left or the center which starts administering 
these kinds of principles or rules. There is nobody in this room who isn't smart enough 
to use those principles to ban the particular genre of speech that most offends them. 
I want to end with the worst first amendment principle, to show why I have no 
respect for the way the courts administer the first amendment. And that's the principle 
that was talked about earlier in the O'Brien case, the incidental impact on the first 
amendment. There is no piece of speech that can't be banned today without taking that 
to its illogical, absurd conclusion. 
The most recent decision was the zoning law on pornography.51 Justice Rehnquist, 
another champion of speech and fundamental freedoms of expression, writes an opinion 
saying that the town folks of Renton could zone movie theaters into the swamps if they 
showed x-rated films. They said they weren't trying to regulate content. You'd think 
maybe they'd care that there was pornography and x-rated movies being shown. How 
foolish of you. They were concerned only with the environmental impact on the resi-
dential area. Sure it had, an incidental impact on speech. But that was only incidental! 
We're all clever enough to manipulate these doctrines to ban whatever it is we want to 
ban, Today it's anti-Holocaust material, tomorrow it's something else. And in the end, 
the choice is between a system of censorship, whether it's civil, criminal, administrative, 
or judicial, and a basic trust in the ability of the citizens to choose what they want to 
believe and what they want to reject, I'm for trust. 
51 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc" 427 U,S. 50 (1976). 
84 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:65 
Mr. Tishler: I just wish you'd take a firm position on something, Alan. 
Professor Berney: All of the grand truths that Alan mentioned were truths that had to do 
with passing judgments, about expressing opinion. I think there has to be a way out of 
the philosopher's closet - the ability to be able to say that we can draw lines between 
fact and opinion, and that when you do start talking about fact, there is a general and 
public interest in holding people to the truth. There is a difference, for instance, between 
saying Jews poison wells and charging certain Jews with poisoning the Love Canal. 
In every litigation, in any context, the truth is the measure. We don't always achieve 
it; we don't always discover it. As Alan can probably demonstrate in any number of 
recent trials, the truth may have been distorted and the wrong judgment may have been 
reached. And that is possible in these cases, too. That's the risk that you would be taking. 
But the answer is that truth is a value, too. 
Statements about whether women belong in the home are not facts. That is a "grand 
opinion," and it is a controlling kind of opinion over society. And the best way that 
society can make determinations about its opinions is by subjecting them to open chal-
lenge. Government should have absolutely nothing to do with all of those other kinds 
of "truths." Facts and opinions do merge, but they remain distinguishable concepts. 
Alan talks about governmental prohibition. Where is the prohibition in what I am 
suggesting? I am not saying: "Put these people in jail." I am not saying: "Shut their 
mouths." I am not saying: "Ban their speech," partly because I think that would be futile, 
but also because I think it would be wrong. I am saying if they want to take these 
positions, then let them be challenged like anyone else, in any number of different 
contexts, in a lawsuit. 
With respect to the question of the slippery slide, all I can say is that I believe that 
the entire history of law could be described in terms of reasonable line drawing. And 
reasonable lines can be drawn here as in any other area. 
I think that we do give the wrong message; the wrong official message. And here's 
where the real governmental influence comes in. There are remedies for false advertising 
and sanctions against offensive pornography. But none for Holocaust Denial. I think it's 
too easy for the government to put this kind of question aside and say: "This is where 
we will demonstrate that we are purists on first amendment grounds." I am concerned 
that the government's real message is: "We don't really care that much about these kinds 
of wrongs." 
Mr. Tishler: This really has been a first-class debate. Arguments and analyses of this 
depth with responsiveness back and forth have not been published anywhere. Those of 
you who'd like to stay, let me take this question and then we11 do it as democratically as 
possible. 
Question: I understood you to say that the Mermelstein case provided a new precedent. I 
am confused because the Mermelstein case was brought under basic contract and tradi-
tional tort causes of action, and I didn't see any new precedent there at all. 
Mr. Tishler: What was the injury to Mermelstein? Did he have to go the hospital for it? 
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Question: Emotional distress. 
Mr. Tishler: Of what kind? 
Question: Severe emotional distress. 
Mr. Tishler: But how did it manifest itself? 
Professor Berney: Let me just intetject one thing in terms of the kinds of things you're 
talking about. Roman law had a cause of action for outrage. Maybe this is the sort of 
thing you're talking about. 
Professor Dershowitz: Well, if it established a precedent, it's a terrible precedent, and I 
hope that cartoonists and editorial writers will continue to outrage politicians and public 
figures. It is my stock and trade to be outrageous, and I want to continue to outrage 
and I don't want anybody to be able to sue me because I outrage people - because I'm 
going to continue. I can afford to continue to outrage people, but a lot of people who 
stand on the corner with truth, outrageous truth, will be deterred from the marketplace 
of ideas if you allow the deep pocket to sue the small pocket for outraging them. 
Question: But what was the cause of action? 
Mr. Tishler: The damage to Mermelstein was never tried. The case was setded. But he 
alleged no physical harm, and in many states, including California, psychic injury is 
enough. But here, there were no allegations of even psychic injury - psychic in the 
sense of manifesting itself in connection with seeing a psychiatrist. Ultimately, that was 
brought into the case. Here, his initial cause of action was that he was offended - and 
I think "outraged" actually was used as a descriptive word - that his piece of history 
could be so maligned. Would you like to continue? 
Question: I just think that it was brought under traditional tort and contract law. I don't 
think there was any precedent established. 
Question: I agree that there was no precedent established, but if there was one it would 
be that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not have to be directed 
towards a specific person. Traditionally, it's always directed towards a specific person. 
Actually, the case is much narrower. It was essentially the Carbolic Smoke Ball case.52 
The offer basically was I would give you a reward if you can prove what I'm offering. 
52 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 2 Q.B. 256 (1893). The Carbolic Smoke Bail Company 
offered a reward to any person who contracted influenza, colds, or any disease caused by cold after 
using their product, the Carbolic Smoke Ball, three times daily for two weeks. Mrs. Carlill used the 
product as directed and contracted influenza and applied for the reward. When the company 
refused to pay, she filed suit. The court held that there was a contract, which by its nature did not 
require notice of acceptance, and that consideration had been given. The company was ordered to 
pay the reward. 
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Mr. Tishler: That was the contract count. And I think, Ruti, you were going to point out 
that that was the connection between the parties, the plaintiff and the defendant here, 
in terms of the tortious conduct. Unfortunately, there wasn't an opportunity to fully 
adjudicate the case and to have some nice dictum with respect to whether or not other 
persons offended by the ad itself, who didn't respond to it necessarily, would have a 
cause of action. 
Professor Dershowitz: Well, I'm glad the case wasn't litigated because he probably would've 
come and asked me to do the appeal for him and I would've done it. I would've won. 
Let me tell a brief story that some people may be too young to remember, but, in a 
town right near Skokie, called Cicero, Illinois, Martin Luther King took a deliberate 
walk through Cicero with his arms around a white woman. He did it for one reason and 
one reason alone. He wanted to provoke outrage in the segregationist northern Cicero, 
Illinois community to show the rest of the world, to provoke in the rest of the world 
outrage, so that what would be seen was that there is deep pervasive racism in the North 
as well as in the South. It sent a powerful message. It outraged the people of Cicero. 
Martin Luther King was right. The Nazis who marched in Skokie were wrong. The 
government can't make judgments of right or wrong, it cannot distinguish between 
Martin Luther King walking through Cicero and a Nazi group walking through Skokie. 
I submit that those judgments are impossible for governments to make. But governments 
can make distinctions between very broad judgments of whether a Holocaust existed 
and an attempt to prove in court that a particular person committed a particular act of 
murder against a particular individual or group of individuals on a given day. Or broader 
judgments that he participated in the movement of trains between such and such a city 
at such and such a place at a particular time. Of course, that can be proved by due 
process of law standards applicable to a particular proceeding. But we're talking about 
making it a crime or a tort to make a statement about a broad historical event. When it 
comes to teaching, of course that's the toughest issue, we do teach values in our schools. 
We do teach about sexual values. We do teach about religious values. We do teach about 
historical fact. We teach that Columbus discovered America on a particular day. We 
teach that the Renaissance began on a particular morning. We teach absurdly to our 
students because we oversimplify. And my point is not that we should demand that 
teachers teach that the Holocaust occurred or that we should demand that they teach it 
didn't occur. The process of education is very complicated. If you want to ask a direct 
question: Would I take a book out of a public school library, which for good reasons the 
public school committee wanted to put in, which raised questions about the existence of 
the Holocaust? No, I would not. I would not as a parent, I would not as an educator, 
and I would not as a constitutionalist. I think that for every reason of policy, it is a good 
thing to have in a school. 
Ms. Ruti Teitel: Yes, but with the book we don't have a captive audience. It's not the same 
thing as Martin Luther King. 
Professor Dershowitz: Yes, but with Martin Luther King you had a captive audience, too. 
Professor Cotler: I think this discussion has been an interesting exercise in what I call 
comparative jurisprudence. In other words, you can't really abstract law or legal process 
from the legal culture in which it reposes. When I was listening to Alan's litany of villains 
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and mediocrities on the bench, I was saying to myself, I'm not sure I'd advocate the 
same position, if I was an American living within the American legal culture. Each 
culture sets up its own organizing idioms and I can identify very briefly six that make 
Canada's a distinguishable legal culture. One, the emphasis on the equality of rights in 
relation to fundamental freedom. Two, what we call in Canada, a domestic jus gentium 
that's been built up over time concerning the prohibition of hate propaganda. Three, 
the ethic of multiculturalism as distinct from the ethos of the melting pot. Four, the 
injunctions; we're looking at other free and democratic societies in our jurisprudence. 
Five, our obligations under international law. And six, the Canadian precedents built up 
over time which now include, at least at the first trial level, Chaplinsky, Roth,55 Beauharnais. 
So you have here, collectively speaking, features that are distinguishable in the Canadian 
legal culture. 
Finally, we are a parliamentary system. You say we should trust the citizens, and in 
a parliamentary system where the Parliament is, in effect, the representative of the 
citizenry and not representative of process. Then, in effect, you trust the Parliament. If 
you can't trust them, you throw them out. But really what we are talking about in this 
prohibition against the dissemination of hate propaganda are not arbitrary and capricious 
hand-downs from above, but really the enactment of legislation from below, by way of 
minorities petitioning governments for redress of grievances and saying over a time we 
want that legislation because these words are maiming and because they're even worse 
than "sticks and stones." 
Professor Dershowitz: And they only win when they get a majority to support them. 
Question: I would like to raise a question that is somewhat separate. In my study of the 
Nazi period, we realized that some of the main perpetrators or culprits of the Holocaust 
itself were people with law degrees. If they had not had lawyers in Nazi Germany, even 
though Hitler didn't like them, much of this would not have happened. 
Mr. Tishler: I knew it would come to this. 
Question: The point is something called professional self-discipline. In other words, on 
what level would this panel advocate disciplining lawyers who disseminate such obvious 
lies knowingly in courtrooms. Everyone has the right to a defense. I understand that. 
But that propaganda was a key element in the Canadian case. If speech by persons on 
street corners or by "intellectuals" in journals published in Southern California or on 
Long Island cannot be prohibited, fine, but cannot this fine profession that you represent, 
I am a member of it ... 
Professor Dershowitz: I don't represent it. 
Professor Henry Friedlander: Can they not discipline their own members? 
Mr. Tishler: Let me refine your question. I think we would all come up with the same 
answer if you asked it at that level of generality. 
"Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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Professor Dershowitz: What would that answer be? 
Mr. Tishler: We would not. Are you saying, for example, that an attorney who represented 
the Institute for Historical Review in the Mermelstein case ought to have been disciplined? 
Professor Friedlander: Mr. Butz at NorthwestemH was not disciplined, erroneously in my 
opinion, by his university even though people are fired for all kinds of absurd reasons. 
But because he's an electrical engineer, his business is really something else. But there 
is a general opinion that if a historian would espouse these ideas, it would be reason for 
a tenure hearing, not because of freedom of speech, but because of professionalism. 
Mr. Tishler: Are you speaking about lawyers as substantive exponents of denial of Hol-
ocaust Denial and whether they should lose membership in the bar - something of that 
nature rather than representing clients? 
Professor Friedlander: You correctly represent my question. 
Mr. Tishler: Well, I can only cite to you the Massachusetts precedent of lawyers who are 
about to be disciplined if they cannot certify that they've paid their Massachusetts income 
tax. A very bad precedent. I don't think that I can concur with that. Arthur, why don't 
you respond. 
Professor Berney: I happen to think that those kinds of internal disciplines are inappro-
priate for all of the first amendment reasons that Alan Dershowitz talks about. I'm not 
interested in curtailing anybody's first amendment rights. And no matter how often I 
say that, Alan wants to ignore it and tum it into a matter of banning and prohibiting. 
That is not what anybody is saying. The closest that he has come to addressing my 
position is that if speechmaking is made expensive, then you're going to be cutting off 
some speech. You're going to have a chilling effect on some speech. That is true. But 
that's not a ban. And if the speech is very important, it will find in the marketplace the 
kinds of support that it needs. 
To repeat, I'm not saying anything about banning or prohibiting, and I would not 
therefore agree with the kind of things that have been suggested with respect to throwing 
people out of the academy or disbarring lawyers who take such positions. All I'm saying 
is that if you have deliberately, intentionally attempted to cause grievous harm, then our 
system should allow for some kind of compensation if the victim can prove harm. The 
first amendment, as the libel cases suggest, is not an absolute bar to that. There are 
other interests that have to be weighed very carefully. The speech that really matters 
the most in a democracy is the speech that is directed at the government; speech that 
challenges the authority. That sort of speech I would be interested in protecting abso-
lutely. That's not what we're talking about here. Here, we're talking about two sets of 
individual or group interests. These private interests must be balanced. 
Now I want to put one question to you, Alan. 
M A. "BUTZ, supra note 3 (claiming that the Holocaust never occurred). 
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Professor Derslwwitz: And then I want to put one to you. 
Professor Berney: All right. Would you outlaw false advertising? Would you outlaw di-
vulgence of trade secrets? 
Professor Derslwwitz: Well, you say "would I?" Certainly you're right in what the first 
amendment does today, and I think some of these are very hard questions. There is a 
problem that a truth has been established - cigarette smoking causes cancer - and, in 
effect, the cigarette industry has been denied their right to deny that truth through 
television advertising, to deny it on the carton of cigarettes. There are problems with 
that. I do think, in general, commercial advertising which is designed largely to sell a 
product is very different. We're talking about governmentally supported speech and I 
can give you an analogy to that. In the Soviet Union, if we adopted your laws, a Jew 
who advocates Zionism would be open to a civil suit because Palestinians and Arabs 
would say that this is the most fundamental denial of their history, of their people, or 
of their nationhood. Zionism in the Soviet Union is as evil a private wrong as one could 
have. And imagine a situation where every time someone advocated Zionism he could 
be sued civilly and made to pay substantial damages by an extremely unsympathetic 
court with a sympathetic plaintiff who is invoking a grand truth. And there is no grander 
truth in the Soviet Union than that Zionism is racism. Since racism is, after all, hateful 
propaganda, we would get to exactly the same result. 
And so, I urge you when you think about these things, don't think about them in 
the context of what our belief system is today. Think about them when Jerry Falwell or 
Pat Robertson is President. 
Mr. Tishler: Let me conclude by amending my answer to an earlier audience question. 
I've reflected further on it and I was wrong. I was wrong in my answer but not in the 
statement or the overstatement I made about the Mermelstein case being a historic prec-
edent. I think that's right. I think it's a historic precedent, at least to my knowledge as 
limited as that might be, because it establishes the principle that the tort for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress can be brought for an intentional misrepresentation of a 
specific historic fact. We tend, I think, in listening to Alan's very persuasive remarks, to 
extrapolate from the comparison with the Soviet Union and Zionism as racism is a useful 
one. But remember that what we're talking about here, from a concrete, practical 
standpoint, is very specific misrepresentation of very specific, irrefutable facts. 
Professor Derslwwitz: Well, it is an irrefutable fact in the Soviet Union that the Jews forced 
the Palestinians out of their homeland. They have pictures to prove it and, if you put 
down twenty-five Soviet social scientists and fifty jurors and judges, the fact that the Jews 
expropriated Palestinian land is as much a fact as the fact that there was a Holocaust. 
Facts are not something that you can show on a video tape. It is a fact in the Soviet 
Union, I have heard it, I have been there, I've debated and discussed it. They think my 
view about what happened in the Middle East is preposterous, absurd. The most out-
rageous statement. And I have to tell you something, a lot of students in the United 
States of America believe them! And fifty years from now, we may live in a time when 
the Zionist perspective on history is going to be regarded as factually wrong, outrageous, 
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and insulting. It happened in England, it has happened in universities in Sweden, it's 
happened in the Soviet Union, and it could happen here. 
Mr. Tishler: Well, at the risk of prolonging the debate, I'll end it by simply pointing out 
that there are facts which are objectively, extrinsically, demonstrably, and empirically 
unassailable. And the Holocaust is one of them. Thank you, everyone. 
Professor Dershowitz: I wish you were right. 
